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Introduction and summary
In January 1999, 11 European countries bravely
launched into a common currency area known as the
European Monetary Union (EMU). By joining the
common currency area, member countries have agreed
to keep the value of their national currency fixed in
terms of the currencies of the other EMU countries
for an indefinite period. Consumers and businesses
in these countries will, however, find that very little
has changed. The most noticeable change will not
occur until 2002 when national currencies are replaced
by a common currency known as the euro. In the inter-
vening period, prices will be denominated in terms
of existing national currencies and euros. Consumers
using cash will pay the national currency price, while
consumers using credit cards (including U.S. visitors
to the euro zone) will notice that their transactions are
carried out in euros.
Although they might disagree about the exact
size of the gains, most economists would agree that
the EMU will yield significant microeconomic bene-
fits through lower transactions and hedging costs.
According to the European Commission, the gains
from carrying out transactions in a single currency
could be as high as 0.5 percent of European Union
gross domestic product (GDP) per year. However,
many economists are skeptical about the long-run
viability of the EMU. Euro-zone members have given
up the right to set their own interest rates and the op-
tion of moving their exchange rates against each other.
The widespread view is that this loss of flexibility
may involve significant costs (in the form of persistent
high unemployment and low output growth) if their
economies do not behave as one or cannot easily
adjust in other ways. The ultimate concern is that
for some countries, these macroeconomic costs will
eventually outweigh the microeconomic benefits and
lead them to abandon the EMU.
How well the EMU performs along the macro
dimension will depend on how closely it fits the notion
of an optimal currency area (OCA). Beginning
with Mundell (1961), economists have long agreed
that the following four criteria must be met for a
region to be an optimal currency area: 1) countries
should be exposed to similar sources of disturbances
(common shocks); 2) the relative importance of these
common shocks should be similar (symmetric shocks);
3) countries should have similar responses to common
shocks (symmetric responses); and 4) if countries are
affected by country-specific sources of disturbance
(idiosyncratic shocks), they need to be able to adjust
quickly. The basic idea is that countries satisfying
these criteria would have similar business cycles, so
a common monetary policy response would be optimal.
How far the euro zone is from an OCA is an open
question for research, as is the more important ques-
tion of whether the apparent deviation from an OCA
is sufficient to question the long-run viability of the
EMU. On the surface, the data seem to support the
skeptics view that the EMU is not an OCA. First,
euro-zone countries have experienced frequent and
often large idiosyncratic shocks over recent years. A
well-known example is German reunification, which
many argue led to the breakdown of the precursor to
the EMU known as the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1992.1 Second, persistently high unemploy-
ment rates throughout Europe suggest that EMU
economies (especially their labor markets) are slow
to adjust to all economic disturbances.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The purpose of this article is to formally assess
the long-run viability of the EMU. I do this by com-
paring the sources and responses to economic shocks
to the EMU with those from a well-functioning cur-
rency union, the U.S. My working hypothesis is that
if the EMU is as close to an OCA as the U.S. is,
based on the criteria outlined above, it may well be
a viable currency union in the long run. If, on the
other hand, the EMU is less like an OCA than the
U.S. is, one might question the long-run viability of
this monetary union.
Despite all the effort that has gone into the EMU
debate, there is little in the way of empirical research
on the sources and responses to economic shocks to
this region. I use a statistical technique known as a
structural vector autoregression (VAR) to extract these
components from the data. My analysis suggests that
U.S. regions are highly symmetric. U.S. regions face
common sources of disturbance, to which they respond
in a similar way. In contrast, the EMU countries can
be grouped into a symmetric center and a clearly
asymmetric periphery. Center countries are Austria,
Belgium-Luxembourg (treated as one country for
data purposes), France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain, while the periphery countries are
Finland and Ireland. Center countries display many of
the characteristics of U.S. regions when compared on
OCA criteria. Periphery countries appear to have quite
different sources of disturbance from the center. In
addition, they seem to respond to common shocks in
a different way from the center countries. I conclude
on the basis of this statistical analysis that the EMU
will be a viable currency union for the center countries,
but question the viability of a union with countries in
the periphery.
Previous empirical analysis of the EMU
The EMU has spawned a number of empirical
papers aimed at understanding the nature of regional
business cycles and the regional impact of fiscal and
monetary polices. The approaches vary considerably.
For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998b) examine
the regional effects of monetary policy within the
EMU. Their approach is indirect. In earlier work,
Carlino and DeFina (1998a) estimated the effects
of U.S. monetary policy on the 48 contiguous U.S.
states (and eight Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA]
regions). They build on this analysis in the later paper
by estimating the cross-sectional relationship between
the long-run regional output response to monetary
policy and industry structure. Their findings suggest
that monetary policy has a larger impact on more
industrial-oriented U.S. regions, such as the Great
Lakes. They use these cross-sectional U.S. findings
and the industry structure of EMU countries to spec-
ulate on the long-run regional impact of monetary
policy within the EMU. Their results suggest that
monetary policy will have a differential impact on
EMU countries. This implies that the EMU is not an
OCA, since it fails to meet the symmetric responses
criterion. In a competing study, Dornbusch, Favero,
and Giavazzi (1998) test this hypothesis directly using
time-series methods and find that the effect of mone-
tary policy is not statistically different across EMU
countries. Their study suggests EMU countries have
similar responses to monetary policy shocks, which
is necessary for a region to be an OCA. An obvious
limitation of this work is that it is silent on the inci-
dence of other disturbances affecting the EMU coun-
tries and the broader question of whether the EMU
will be viable in the long run.
Eichengreen has approached the question of
whether the EMU is an OCA from a number of inter-
esting directions. Eichengreen (1992) joins others in
gauging the importance of country-specific shocks
by computing the variability of bilateral EMU real
exchange rates, for example, the real exchange rate
between Germany and France. The basic idea is that
these relative price fluctuations reflect shifts in demand
and supply affecting one EMU country relative to
another, so countries with more highly correlated
disturbances will have less volatile bilateral real
exchange rates. The typical approach of this type of
study is to compare the volatility of bilateral EMU
real exchange rates with the volatility of relative out-
put prices of U.S. BEA regions. A common finding is
that the bilateral real exchange rates of EMU countries
are considerably more volatile than the relative output
prices of U.S. regions. This suggests that the EMU is
further than the U.S. is from being an OCA. An obvi-
ous weakness of this type of analysis is that it does
not directly compare the EMU and the U.S. using the
OCA criteria outlined earlier.
Observing this limitation, Eichengreen and
Bayoumi (1993) approach the issue in a more direct
way. They estimate individual models for U.S. BEA
regions and EMU countries using a technique devel-
oped by Blanchard and Quah (1989), which allows
them to extract unobserved components from the
data that describe so-called demand and supply
shocks. Demand and supply shocks are distinguished
by the fact that demand shocks are assumed to have
a temporary impact on the economy, while supply
shocks are assumed to have a permanent effect on
the economy. Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1993) then
compare the correlation coefficients of German supply
(and demand) shocks and those of other EMU countries4 Economic Perspectives
with the correlation coefficients of U.S. Mideast supply
(and demand) shocks and those of other U.S. regions.
They show that U.S. regional supply (and demand)
shocks tend to be more highly correlated than EMU
regional supply (and demand) shocks. The final step
of their analysis is to compare regional responses to
demand and supply shocks. Their results suggest that
the response functions of U.S. regions are more alike
than those of EMU countries. On the basis of this
analysis, they conclude that the EMU is further than
the U.S. is from being an OCA, which leads them to
argue that the EMU may find it more difficult than
the U.S. to operate a monetary union.
My empirical analysis builds on Eichengreen
and Bayoumi (1993) along two dimensions. First, I
update their work by analyzing more recent data.
Eichengreen and Bayoumis data spanned the years
from 1963 to 1986, while I consider data covering
the years from 1969 to 1997. These data are likely to
be more informative about the behavior of countries
under the EMU, since they include a greater number
of years over which the EMU countries were part
of the forerunner to the EMU, the EMS. Second, I
adopt a different way of decomposing the data that
allows me to directly measure the extent to which
regional business cycles are driven by common and
country-specific shocks. My conclusions differ from
Eichengreen and Bayoumis. In contrast to their find-
ings, I show that with the exception of two relatively
small countries, Finland and Ireland, the euro zone
shares many of the regional business cycle character-
istics of the U.S. In other words, the EMU comes as
close to being an OCA as the U.S. does. I argue on the
basis of these results that the long-run viability of the
EMU is similar to that of the U.S. monetary union.
A weakness of all the foregoing empirical research
is that historical data may be an unreliable guide to
the way euro-zone countries will behave under the
EMU. This observation is a simple application of the
Lucas critique. The basic idea is that historical data
may be uninformative since the structure of euro-zone
economies (and possibly the world economy) will
likely undergo significant change after the EMU
adopts a common currency. Frankel and Rose (1998)
find empirical support for this proposition by showing
that one form of structural change that may occur
under the single currency, greater trade flows between
countries, leads to more highly correlated business
cycles. A consequence of their work for all EMU
studies is that countries that may appear from historical
data to be poor candidates for inclusion in the euro zone
may indeed turn out to be suitable candidates after
joining the union. This clearly has implications for
earlier work that argued against the long-run viability
of the EMU. I argue that the EMU will be viable in
the long run, so Frankel and Roses results merely
reinforce my conclusions.
How similar are EMU country
business cycles?
A simple and direct way of assessing the similarity
of regional business cycles is to calculate the correlation
between aggregate and individual region business
cycles. High correlations are indicative of common
sources and responses to disturbances. In figure 1,
I plot cyclical movements in U.S. aggregate and
regional real income.2 The underlying data are BEA
annual state personal income from 1969 to 1997.
These data are deflated by the national consumer
price index.3 I use personal income rather than gross
state product because the former span a longer period.4
The eight BEA regions are the Great Lakes, Plains,
New England, Mideast, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky
Mountains, and Far West.5 The lowest correlation
between a region and the U.S. aggregate is 0.76 for
the Southwest, with the highest at 0.98 for the South-
east and Great Lakes. This suggests that common
shocks explain a large share of the variation in U.S.
regional income.
I repeat this exercise for the EMU. Figure 2
plots the cyclical fluctuations of aggregate and regional
EMU income. The underlying data are International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates of real annual GDP
from 1969 to 1997. The correlations between regional
and aggregate activity can easily be divided into
two groups. The first groupAustria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spainresemble the U.S. regions, with
correlations ranging from 0.72 (Spain) to 0.90
(Germany and Italy). The second group of Finland
and Ireland, with correlations of 0.45 and 0.58, respec-
tively, appear to have business cycles that are quite
different from the rest of the euro zone.
With the exception of Finland and Ireland, the
coherence between EMU regional business cycles
appears to be as high as that of U.S. BEA regions.
On the basis of these results, a subset of the EMU
can not be ruled out as a viable currency union. An
obvious weakness of this approach is that it does not
allow for a comparison of the sources of disturbances
or responses to disturbances across regions. Next,
I describe a statistical technique that overcomes this
limitation. Using these results, I can more closely
gauge the extent to which the EMU and the U.S. meet
the OCA criteria described earlier.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Are the sources of shocks and responses to
them similar across EMU countries?
Methodology
My starting point for isolating the sources of re-
gional shocks and responses to them is recent work
analyzing the regional effects of U.S. monetary policy.
The typical approach is to use a structural vector au-
toregression (VAR). A VAR is a statistical method
that allows one to estimate how an unpredictable
change (or disturbance) in one variable affects other
variables in the economy. For example, one of the
questions raised by theoretical research is whether a
change in monetary policy has a stronger effect on
regions that devote a larger share of activity to indus-
trial production. A VAR allows one to estimate the























Note: Personal income data are filtered using the annual “business cycle” band-pass filter described
in Baxter and King (1995).
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1969–97,
“State personal income,” database.







Note: Gross domestic product filtered as described in figure 1.
Source: Author’s calculations from International Monetary Fund, gross domestic product data.
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affects the output of regions with relatively large and
small industrial sectors.
There is a wide range of variables one can use
in analyzing regional business cycles. I follow the
approach of Carlino and DeFina (1998a) by limiting
the analysis of U.S. regional business cycles to eight
VARs, which essentially study interaction between
the U.S. and a given region, in this case the eight
BEA regions. I adopt a slightly different structural
model by drawing on the approach of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) in their work on iden-
tifying and measuring the aggregate effects of U.S.
monetary policy shocks. Each U.S. regional VAR is
designed to study how unpredicted changes in world
oil prices, aggregate U.S. and regional income, and
U.S. monetary policy (U.S. federal funds rate) affect
the regions income.
VAR studies of international business cycles take
a somewhat similar approach to the U.S. regional
business cycle literature. International research has
focused almost exclusively on the relationship between
U.S. and G-7 (Group of Seven) business cycles under
different exchange rate regimes.6 This type of analysis
is generally restricted to bilateral VARs involving the
U.S. and a G-7 country. I adapt this approach to the
EMU. I employ 10 VARs. Just as in the U.S. regional
case, each EMU VAR is designed to study how unpre-
dicted changes in world oil prices, aggregate EMU
and country of interest income, and EMU region
monetary policy (German short-term
interest rate) affect the EMU countrys income.
I estimate the U.S. and EMU VARs using annual
data over a common period spanning 1969 to 1997.
I limit the U.S. and EMU VARs so that they estimate
relationships between the four variables (world oil
prices, aggregate income, regional income, and a
regional short-term interest rate) with data from the
last two years. In other words, I estimate the link
between movements in aggregate and regional income
that occurred within the last two years.
Before I can shed light on the nature of regional
disturbances and responses to them, I need to impose
some structure on the system of equations described
by the VARs. There are numerous forms of identify-
ing restrictions in the literature. In their work on the
EMU, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1993) impose long-
run restrictions on the data motivated by a theoretical
model. I use a recursive structure popularized by
Sims (1972). This approach imposes restrictions on
the covariance structure of the disturbances of the
model. In particular, structural disturbances are iden-
tified by imposing a recursive information ordering.
Throughout the analysis, I impose the following
information ordering: world oil prices; aggregate
regional income; indicator of regional monetary policy;
and regional or country income. This approach as-
sumes, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1994) that the monetary authority chooses the value
of the monetary policy instrument after observing
contemporaneous movements in oil prices and aggre-
gate output.7 In this setting I can conveniently refer
to the structural disturbances as an oil price or global
shock, aggregate output shock, monetary policy shock,
and region- or country-specific output shock.
With these models in hand, I am able to assess
the similarity of EMU and U.S. regional business
cycles along two dimensions. First, by studying the
sources of regional economic disturbances in the U.S.
and EMU, I can determine the extent to which fluc-
tuations are caused by common and idiosyncratic
shocks. In the U.S. case, common shocks include
unpredicted changes to world oil prices, aggregate
U.S. income, and U.S. monetary policy (U.S. federal
funds rate). Similarly, in the case of the EMU, aggre-
gate shocks include unpredicted changes to world oil
prices, aggregate EMU income, and EMU monetary
policy (German short-term interest rate). Idiosyncratic
shocks are captured by U.S. region-specific and
EMU country-specific output shocks. The relative
importance of the various sources of disturbance
will be revealed by the share of the one-step-ahead
forecast error of U.S. region or EMU country income
that is due to unpredicted changes in the disturbance.
In a perfectly symmetric case, regions would have
none of their forecast error explained by region-
specific shocks and the same shares for the various
common shocks.
Second, by studying the responses to economic
disturbances, I can assess whether regions have similar
responses to common shocks and determine the time it
takes regions to respond to idiosyncratic shocks. The
way that region and country income responds to vari-
ous disturbances will be embodied in the estimated
parameters of the VAR and revealed through the shape
and size of the models impulse response function.
For a description of the methodology in greater
detail, see the appendix.
Do U.S. regions have similar economic
disturbances?
Tables 1 and 2 report decompositions of the
forecast errors of income for U.S. regions and EMU
countries, respectively. These decompositions indi-
cate the share of the error attributable to a particular
disturbance for a given forecast horizon. The one-
step-ahead errors are informative about the similarity
of disturbances across regions within a currency area,8 Economic Perspectives
while step lengths of greater than one contain joint
information about the similarity of disturbances and
responses to disturbances.
Table 1 reveals that a large share of the distur-
bance to U.S. regions is due to common shocks (that
is, unanticipated shocks to world oil prices, aggregate
U.S. income, and U.S. monetary policy). For example,
common disturbances explain a large share of the
variation in the Southeast, Great Lakes, Mideast, and
Far Wests one-step-ahead forecast error (84 percent
to 95 percent). The Rocky Mountains and Plains
appear to have the largest region-specific influences,
with 60 percent and 64 percent, respectively, of the
variation in their one-step-ahead forecast errors
explained by common disturbances. New England
and the Southwest fall somewhere in between, with
common disturbances explaining a little more than
70 percent of the variation in their one-step-ahead
forecast errors. The relative importance of different
common shocks is also similar across U.S. regions.
Shocks to aggregate U.S. income are a more impor-
tant source than shocks to world oil prices and
TABLE 1
Forecast error variance decompositions for real personal income of U.S. regions
Great Lakes
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Great Lakes
ahead prices income rate income
13 5 5 80 6
23 9 5 35 3
52 1 2 1 5 7 1
10 26 20 51 3
New England
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds New England
ahead prices income rate income
13 53 6 0 2 9
23 81 4 5 4 4
5 33 4 26 37
10 33 8 29 29
Southeast
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Southeast
ahead prices income rate income
14 1 5 40 5
25 8 3 62 4
53 9 1 4 3 7 1 0
10 38 14 39 9
Rocky Mountains
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Rocky Mtns.
ahead prices income rate income
12 0 4 0 0 4 0
22 4 3 0 2 4 4
51 0 1 73 2 4 0
10 9 19 46 26
Plains
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Plains
ahead prices income rate income
11 6 4 7 0 3 6
22 5 5 4 2 1 8
51 8 3 33 3 1 5
10 23 29 29 19
Mideast
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Mideast
ahead prices income rate income
11 2 7 41 1 4
21 6 4 2 1 1 3 1
52 4 1 5 3 3 2 7
10 26 17 31 25
Southwest
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Southwest
ahead prices income rate income
12 7 2 02 6
21 6 8 23 0
5 3 50 16 31
10 2 48 26 24
Far West
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil U.S. Fed funds Far West
ahead prices income rate income
12 6 5 71 1 6
24 0 4 20 1 8
54 2 3 27 1 8
10 43 31 13 13
Notes: Each panel describes the decomposition of the forecast error for the region of interest’s
income. The first column in each block refers to the number of years (s = 1, 2, ..., 10) ahead for
the forecast.  Columns indicate the percentage of the s-step-ahead forecast error arising from
a particular structural disturbance.
Source: Calculations from author’s statistical model, using the following annual data series: IMF—world crude
oil prices; BEA—personal income by state; and Federal Reserve Board of Governors—federal funds rate.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
U.S. monetary policy. Overall, these results suggest
that U.S. regions have similar sources of economic
disturbances.
Table 1 also provides some indication of the simi-
larity of responses to disturbances. Looking at horizons
of greater than one year, the relative importance of
TABLE 2
Forecast error variance decompositions for real gross domestic product of EMU countries
Austria
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Austrian
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
11 7 4 3 13 9
21 2 5 01 52 4
51 3 2 35 01 3
10 22 13 56 9
Finland
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Finnish
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
13 0 4 9 3
21 4 2 9 4
51 7 1 2 56 6
10 19 14 7 60
Germany
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest German
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
11 7 70 2 2
2 1 59 15 25
5 6 34 43 17
10 10 35 42 14
Italy
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Italian
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
1 1 5 3 31 33 9
2 1 4 3 21 53 9
5 1 7 1 04 92 5
10 19 8 44 28
Portugal
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Portuguese
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
1 1 47 14 38
21 4 4 94 6
5 5 18 46 32
10 7 21 41 30
Belgium-Luxembourg
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Bel-Lux
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
12 4 5 6 02 0
21 9 5 21 31 6
51 7 2 15 5 7
10 26 18 49 7
France
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest French
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
11 8 00 2 0
21 5 5 7 52 3
52 0 2 14 81 1
10 16 23 47 13
Ireland
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Irish
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
10 32 9 5
20 79 8 5
52 2 1 6 8 0
10 1 2 7 91
Netherlands
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Dutch
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
11 2 4 9 63 3
2 6 41 20 33
5 3 18 41 37
1 0 2 2 04 23 5
Spain
Percentage of forecast error due to
Years Oil EMU EMU interest Spanish
ahead prices GDP rate GDP
1 2 45 15 38
2 1 36 27 36
5 6 22 46 25
10 11 21 45 24
Notes: Each panel describes the decomposition of the forecast error for the country of interest’s
GDP . The first column in each block refers to the number of years (s = 1, 2, ..., 10) ahead for the
forecast. Columns indicate the percentage of the s-step-ahead forecast error arising from a
particular structural disturbance.
Source: Calculations from author’s statistical model, using the following annual data series:
IMF—world crude oil prices, interest rates, and gross domestic product.10 Economic Perspectives
common and idiosyncratic disturbances is largely
unchanged. This suggests that responses are fairly
similar. A common finding is that unanticipated
shocks to aggregate U.S. income are less important
at longer horizons.
Are EMU country economic disturbances more
alike than those of U.S. regions?
Table 2 reports forecast error decompositions for
the income of EMU countries. Concentrating on the
one-step-ahead forecast error, countries fall into three
groups. Common shocks explain about 80 percent
of the one-step-ahead forecast errors of income in
Belgium-Luxembourg, France, and Germany. This
share is a little above 60 percent for Austria, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The outliers
are Finland and Ireland, where this share falls below
10 percent.
The decompositions of the first EMU group are
similar to the U.S. group comprising the Great Lakes,
Southeast, Mideast, and Far West. The second EMU
group has forecast error decompositions that are close
to those of the U.S. Rocky Mountain and Plains
regions. In both cases, oil price shocks are relatively
less important than in their U.S. counterpart, while
interest rate shocks are relatively more important
than in the U.S. regions. Just as in the U.S., aggregate
income shocks are the most important economic dis-
turbance to EMU country income. The findings sug-
gest that, with the exception of Finland and Ireland,
EMU country economic disturbances are as alike as
those of U.S. regions.
Again, ignoring Finland and Ireland, the long-
horizon picture of EMU disturbances is also similar
to the U.S. This suggests that EMU responses to dis-
turbances may well be as alike as U.S. responses.
Do U.S. regions have similar responses
to economic disturbances?
Figures 36 describe in detail the responses of
the eight BEA regions to common and idiosyncratic
shocks. The black lines trace the impulse response
functions of regional income: the way regional income
responds over time to a one standard deviation shock
to world oil prices, aggregate output, U.S. monetary
policy, and regional income, respectively. (The colored
lines are the 95 percent confidence bands of these
impulse response functions.) These figures show that
U.S. regions have similar responses to common distur-
bances (unanticipated shocks to world oil prices, ag-
gregate U.S. output, and U.S. monetary policy) and
that they adjust to idiosyncratic shocks over a period
of about two years.
Figure 3 shows that an unanticipated increase in
the growth rate of world oil prices has a significant
negative impact on the income of seven of the eight
U.S. regions, which persists for about one year. The
exception is the Southwest, which is the largest oil
producing region of the U.S. Although the result is
not statistically significant, an increase in the growth
rate of world oil prices raises Southwest real income.
In contrast, figure 4 reveals that an unexpected
positive shock to aggregate U.S. income has an im-
mediate positive impact on the income of all U.S.
regions. The effect of this shock on regional income
is generally not statistically significant beyond two
years. The only exception is the Southwest, where the
aggregate income shock has a statistically significant
effect six years after the shock.
Figure 5 shows that an unexpected tightening of
U.S. monetary policy (an unexpected rise in the U.S.
federal funds rate) tends to have a statistically signif-
icant effect on U.S. regional income two years after
the shock. The exceptions are the Southwest and Far
West. In both cases, the impulse response function is
virtually identical to those of other U.S. regions, but
not statistically different from the zero line.
Turning to idiosyncratic shocks, figure 6 reveals
that U.S. regions adjust quickly to region-specific dis-
turbances. The regions can be divided into two groups.
The first group, consisting of the Great lakes, Plains,
Southeast, and Far West, have responses that are not
statistically significant beyond the year in which the
shock occurs. The second group, comprising New
England, Mideast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountains,
have responses that are statistically significant for no
more than three years after the shock.
Do EMU countries have responses that are more
alike than those of U.S. regions?
Figures 710 (pages 1518) describe in detail
the response functions of the EMU countries to com-
mon and idiosyncratic disturbances. These figures
suggest that, with the clear exceptions of Finland and
Ireland, the response functions of EMU countries are
at least as alike as those of U.S. regions. In addition,
the response functions imply that contrary to the gen-
eral view, EMU countries adjust to idiosyncratic shocks
at the same speed or faster than U.S. regions.
In contrast to the U.S. result, figure 7 shows that
an unexpected positive shock to the change in world
oil prices does not have a statistically significant effect
on the income of all EMU countries.
However, figure 8 shows that an unanticipated
positive shock to aggregate EMU output has a statis-
tically significant positive effect on the output of





Rocky Mountains Far West
Notes: All figures report changes in the region of interest’s real personal income following a one standard
deviation shock to the given variable. The black line represents the point estimates of the impulse response
function for the region of interest. The colored lines are the 95 percent confidence bands, computed by
Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000 independent draws.
Source: Calculations from author’s statistical model, using the following annual data series: International
Monetary Fund—world crude oil prices; Bureau of Economic Analysis—personal income by state; and
Federal Reserve Board of Governors—federal funds rate.
U.S. output response: Shock to world oil prices
(percent)
number of years after shock number of years after shock
shock. Again, the exceptions are Finland and Ireland,
where the effects of the aggregate output shock are
not statistically significant.
Turning to the regional monetary shock, we see
in figure 9 that EMU responses are not only similar
across countries, but also quite similar to the U.S.
response functions. As in the U.S., an unanticipated
tightening in regional monetary policy (an unantici-
pated increase in the German overnight money market





Rocky Mountains Far West
Notes and source: See figure 3.
U.S. output response: Shock to aggregate U.S. income
(percent)
number of years after shock number of years after shock
years after the shock. It is important to note that
Finland and Ireland have similar responses to the rest
of the EMU, but their responses are not statistically
different from zero.
Finally, figure 10 describes the rate at which EMU
countries adjust to country-specific shocks. Ignoring
Finland and Ireland, there are essentially two groups,
just as there are in the U.S. case. The first group,
consisting of Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, France,
Germany, and Italy, have response functions that are
not statistically different from zero a year after the
shock. The second group, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain, adjust in under three years. The response
functions of Finland and Ireland display considerably
longer adjustment periods. In the case of Ireland,
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U.S. output response: Shock to U.S. federal funds rate
(percent)
Notes and source: See figure 3.
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The lessons learned from the simple business
cycle analysis of the previous section carry over to the
VAR analysis. The EMU is characterized by a highly
symmetric centerAustria, Belgium-Luxembourg,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spainand an asymmetric peripheryFinland and
Ireland. As noted earlier, the center countries have
highly correlated business cycle fluctuations. The
VAR analysis shows that these correlations are sup-
ported by common sources of disturbance and simi-
lar responses to these shocks. The VAR analysis also
reveals that EMU countries and U.S. regions behave
similarly along both these dimensions. Finally, in
contrast to anecdotal evidence, the VAR analysis
suggests that EMU countries adjust to idiosyncratic
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U.S. output response: Shock to U.S. regional income
(percent)
Notes and source: See figure 3.
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Conclusion
The answer to the question of whether a currency
union will be viable in the long run depends to a
large extent on how far the union is from being an
OCA. With this in mind, I assess the long-run viability
of the EMU by comparing the EMU with a viable
currency union (the U.S.) based on critical OCA
criteria. My working hypothesis is that if the EMU is
as close as the U.S. is to being an OCA, then there
could be no presumption that the EMU would not be
viable in the long run. Alternatively, if the EMU is
much further from being an OCA than the U.S. is,
then the adoption of a single currency could be prob-
lematic for some EMU countries and would call into
question the viability of this monetary union. My
analysis suggests that the behavior of countries at
the center of the EMU is very similar to that of U.S.






EMU output response: Shock to world oil prices
(percent)
Portugal Spain
Notes: See figure 3.
Source: Calculations from author’s statistical model, using the following annual data series:
International Monetary Fund—world crude oil prices, short-term interest rates, and gross domestic product.







Notes: See figure 3.
Source: See figure 7.
number of years after shock number of years after shock
EMU output response: Shock to aggregate EMU output






EMU output response: Shock to EMU interest rates
(percent)
Portugal Spain
Notes: See figure 3.
Source: See figure 7.







EMU output response: Shock to EMU country income
(percent)
Notes: See figure 3.
Source: See figure 7.
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countries in the periphery of the EMU, Finland and
Ireland, are quite different from their EMU partners
with regard to the OCA criteria. On the basis of this
statistical analysis, I conclude that the EMU will
APPENDIX
A VAR analysis of regional business cycles
This appendix describes my methodology in greater
technical detail. To isolate the various exogenous
shocks, including monetary policy shocks, I use the
vector autoregression (VAR) procedure developed by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994). Let Zt
denote the 4 × 1 vector of all variables in the model
at date t. This vector includes changes in the log of
world oil prices (POIL), log levels of aggregate U.S.
(or euro-zone) income (YA), log levels of one of the
eight U.S. regions (or 10 euro-zone countries) income
(YR), and the level of the U.S. federal funds (or German
overnight money market) rate (R), which I assume is
the U.S. (or euro-zone) monetary policy indicator.
The order of the variables is:
1) Zt = (POILt, YAt, Rt, YRt).
 I assume that Zt follows a second-order VAR:
2) Zt= A0 + A1Zt1 + A2Zt2+ ut,
where A0, A1, and A2 are 4 × 4 coefficient matrices,
and the 4 × 1 disturbance vector ut is serially uncor-
related. I assume that the fundamental exogenous
process that drives the economy is a 4 × 1 vector
process {et} of serially uncorrelated shocks, with a
covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. The
VAR disturbance vector ut is a linear function of a
vector et of underlying economic shocks, as follows:
ut = C et,
where the 4 × 4 matrix C is the unique lower-triangu-
lar decomposition of the covariance matrix of ut:
CC¢ = E [ ut ut¢  ].
This structure implies that the jth element of ut
is correlated with the first j elements of et, but is or-
thogonal to the remaining elements of et.
In setting policy, the U.S. Federal Reserve (or the
euro-zone member central banks) both reacts to and
affects the economy; I use the VAR structure to cap-
ture these cross-directional relationships. I assume that
the feedback rule can be written as a linear function,
Y, defined over a vector, Wt, of variables observed at
or before date t. That is, if I let Rt denote the U.S.
federal funds rate (or German overnight money mar-
ket rate), then U.S. (or euro-zone) monetary policy
is completely described by:
3) Rt = Y (Wt) + c3,3e3t,
where e3t is the third element of the fundamental
shock vector et, and c3,3 is the (3, 3) element of the
matrix C. (Recall that Rt is the third element of Zt.) In
equation 3, Y (Wt) is the feedback-rule component of
U.S. (or euro-zone) monetary policy, and c3,3 e3t is the
exogenous U.S. (or euro-zone) monetary policy shock.
Since e3t has unit variance, c3,3 is the standard devia-
tion of this policy shock. Following Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994), I model Wt as contain-
ing lagged values (dated t  1 and earlier) of all vari-
ables in the model, as well as time t values of those
variables the monetary authority looks at contempo-
raneously in setting policy. In accordance with the
assumptions of the feedback rule, an exogenous
shock e3t to monetary policy cannot contemporane-
ously affect time t values of the elements of Wt. How-
ever, lagged values of e3t can affect the variables in Wt.
I incorporate equation 3 into the VAR structure
described by equations 1 and 2. Variables POIL and
YA  are the contemporaneous inputs to the monetary
feedback rule. These are the only components of Wt
that are not determined prior to date t. With this struc-
ture, I can identify the right-hand side of equation 3
with the third equation in VAR equation 2: Y (Wt)
equals the third row of A0 + A1Zt1 + A2Zt2, plus S2
i=1
c3,i eit (where c3,i denotes the (3, i) element of matrix
C, and eit denotes the ith element of et ). Note that Rt
is correlated with the first three elements of et. By
construction the shock c3,3e3t to U.S. (or euro-zone)
monetary policy is uncorrelated with the monetary
policy feedback rule Wt.
I estimate matrices A0, A1, A2 and C by ordinary
least squares. The response of any variable in Zt to
an impulse in any element of the fundamental shock
vector et can then be computed by using equations
1 and 2.
The standard error bounds in figures 3 through
10 are computed using the following bootstrap Monte
likely be a viable currency union for the center coun-
tries, but question the viability of a union with coun-
tries in the periphery.20 Economic Perspectives
Carlo procedure. First, I construct 1,000 time series
of the vector Zt each of length T, where T denotes the
number of observations in my data sample. Let {xt}T
t=1
denote the vector of residuals from the estimated VAR.
I construct 1,000 sets of new time series of residuals,
{xt(j)}T
t=1, j = 1, ..., 1,000. The tth element of {xt(j)}T
t=1
is selected by drawing randomly, with replacement,
from the set of estimated residuals vectors {xt}T
t=1.
For each {xt(j)}T
t=1, I construct a synthetic time series
Zt, denoted {Zt(j)}T
t=1, using the estimated VAR and
the historical initial conditions on Zt. Next, I reestimate
the VAR using {Zt(j)}T
t=1 and the historical initial con-
ditions and calculate the implied impulse response
functions for j = 1, ..., 1,000. For each lag, I calculate
the 25th lowest and 975th highest value of the corre-
sponding impulse response coefficient across all 1,000
synthetic impulse response functions. The boundaries
of the confidence intervals in the figures correspond to
a plot of these coefficients.
1See Corden (1993), chapters 79, for an extended discussion of
the EMS and events surrounding the 1992 breakdown of the system.
2In general, time-series data are nonstationary. Nonstationary data
do not have well-defined standard deviations or correlations. One
way of overcoming this problem is to filter the data using a filter
that removes the nonstationary components and renders the data
stationary. There is a range of filtering techniques available, includ-
ing linear time trends and first differencing. Baxter and King (1995)
have designed a filter that isolates components of the data that policy
analysts are interested in, the so-called business cycle frequencies
of one and a half to eight years. I use a BaxterKing filter to isolate
cyclical movements in U.S. and EMU time series.
3Consumer price indexes do exist for metropolitan areas in the
various BEA regions. However, there is a very high degree of
correlation in consumer price fluctuations across these metropoli-
tan areas. In addition, using region-specific price series would
impose a further limit on the analysis since many metropolitan
indexes are not available after 1986.
4The gross product by state is available from 1977 to 1997.
5See Carlino and DeFina (1998a), appendix A, for a listing of
states by BEA region.
6For examples, see references in Kouparitsas (1998).
7Carlino and DeFina (1998a) assume a similar recursive informa-
tion ordering in their analysis of the regional impact of U.S.
monetary policy.
REFERENCES
Baxter, M., and R. G. King, 1995, Measuring
business cycles: Approximate band-pass filters for
economic time series, National Bureau of Economic
Research, working paper, No. 5022.
Blanchard, O., and D. Quah, 1989, The dynamic
effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances,
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp.
655673.
Carlino, G. A., and R. DeFina, 1998a, The differen-
tial regional effects of monetary policy, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 572587.
                    , 1998b, Monetary policy and the U.S.
states and regions: Some implications for European
monetary union, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia, working paper, No. 98-17.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans,
1994, Identification and the effects of monetary
policy shocks, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
working paper, No. 94-7.
Corden, W. M., 1993, Economic Policy, Exchange
Rates, and the International System, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Dornbusch, R., C. A. Favero, and F. Giavazzi,
1998, The immediate challenges for the European
Central Bank, National Bureau of Economic
Research, working paper, No. 6369.
Eichengreen, B. J., 1992, Is Europe an optimum
currency area?, reprinted in European Monetary
Unification: Theory, Practice, and Analysis, B. J.
Eichengreen (ed.), Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 5171.
Eichengreen, B. J., and T. Bayoumi, 1993, Shock-
ing aspects of European monetary unification,
reprinted in European Monetary Unification: Theory,
Practice, and Analysis, B. J. Eichengreen (ed.),
Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 73109.
Frankel, J. A., and A. K. Rose, 1998, The endogene-
ity of the optimum currency area criteria, Economic
Journal, Vol. 108, July, pp. 10091025.
Kouparitsas, M. A., 1998, Are international busi-
ness cycles different under fixed and flexible exchange
rate regimes? Economic Perspectives, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 4664.
Mundell, R. A., 1961, A theory of optimum currency
areas, American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4,
pp. 657665.
Sims, C., 1972, Money, income, and causality, Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 540552.
NOTES